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Abstract  
The pervasiveness of wireless communication recently gave mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) a significant 
researcher’s attention, due to its innate capabilities of instant communication in many time and mission critical 
applications. However, its natural advantages of networking in civilian and military environments make them 
vulnerable to security threats. Support for an anonymity in MANET is an orthogonal to security critical challenge we 
faced in this paper. We propose a new anonymous authentication protocol for mobile ad hoc networks enhanced with 
a distributed reputation system. The main its objective is to provide mechanisms concealing a real identity of 
communicating nodes with an ability of resist to known attacks. The distributed reputation system is incorporated for 
a trust management and malicious behavior detection in the network. The end-to-end anonymous authentication is 
conducted in three-pass handshake based on an asymmetric and symmetric key cryptography. After successfully 
finished authentication phase secure and multiple anonymous data channels are established. The anonymity is 
guarantied by randomly chosen pseudonyms owned by a user. Nodes of the network are publicly identified and are 
independent of users’ pseudonyms. In this paper we presented an example of the protocol implementation.  
1 Introduction  
The wireless and mobile communication is a incessantly evolving area providing an ability of flexible and 
convenient communication with phones, mobile or handheld computers, and almost every contemporary electronic 
home devices. For known wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi (802.11), IrDA, Bluetooth, communication between 
network devices is usually realized in a point-to-point model. In mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) devices, 
interchangeably called nodes, do not have a priori knowledge of network topology surrounding them and they have 
to discover it. The communication in stuctureless environment assumes a model of intermediate nodes which 
interconnect devices lying beyond its radio range. In order to make that multihop network operational the self-
configuring and self-organizing mechanisms must be introduced to the routing protocols. The basic idea of routing 
protocol for ad hoc network is to announce a new node presence and listen to broadcast announcements from its 
neighbors. The way how the node learns about new neighboring nodes is based on the path discovery algorithms and 
characterizes particular routing protocol. The are several different approaches delivering discovery path feature in ad 
hoc networks however two groups of them are most popular: reactive (on-demand) and proactive (table-driven). The 
first type of routing addresses destination node path resolving on demand of source node whereas the second 
approach is more preventive and continuously is trying to keep routing tables up to date by monitoring the nearest 
neighborhood. The comparison and features description routing protocols for ad hoc networks may be found in [7], 
[8], and [17] and is beyond of this paper. 
In recent years mobile ad hoc networks have received significant researcher’s attention due to capabilities of 
establishing an instant communication in many time-critical and mission-critical applications. Many security 
protocols have been devised to protect a communication in ad hoc networks [10], [20], however the only few of them 
address privacy guaranties [3], [4], and [5]. Leaving mobile nodes traceable by wireless traffic and data analysis 
makes the anonymity support in MANET critical challenge.  
In this paper we propose a new anonymous authentication protocol for mobile ad hoc networks enhanced with a 
distributed reputation system. The main objective of this work is to provide protocol with mechanisms concealing 
real identity communicating nodes and resisting to known attacks [6], [23]. The distributed reputation system is 
incorporated in order to build and manage trust of communicating nodes. The trust knowledge reflects trustworthy 
and malicious activity in the network effectively supporting anonymous authentication and path discovery phases. 
Proposed protocol delivers secure exchange data links based on on-demand routing approach [1], [7], and [8].  
  
The following sections present related work and cover in details a protocol construction supplemented by its 
anonymous properties analysis. The last section presents some concluding remarks and further research directions. 
2 Background 
A set of informal notions of anonymity and its related properties can be found in [23] and [6] where Pfitzman et al. 
characterize general anonymous system with identity management regarding fixed network topology easily 
applicable for MANET. There was several work done in a scope of securing mobile ad hoc networks [10], [20], 
much less [15] addressing privacy aspects.  
 In terms of authentication in mobile ad hoc networks there are three conventional approaches and they 
derive from variety of existing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks [10], [20].  
• First method is based on shared session key widely distributed in the network [18]. This approach does not 
provide anonymity and is vulnerable to single node compromise.  
• Second one assumes sharing pairwise keys between all nodes in the networks but it suffers from lack of 
scalability. In this case for N nodes N(N-1)/2 keys are required a priory to allow communication [8].  
• The third approach takes an advantage of scalable public key cryptography and digital certificates providing 
network nodes with mutually authentication with challenge-response mechanism [9], [19]. However this 
method is flexible and efficient the trusted authority is required still.  
All of aforementioned methods assume existence of trusted TA or certificate authority CA dealing with key setup 
phase. Online and distributed CA providing a keys management in anonymous environment are not trivial task and 
pay researchers’ attention [11],[10],[20].  
 Anonymity schemes in mobile ad hoc networks were proposed in [3], [4], and [5]. ANODR [5] is based on 
on-demand with identity free routing protocol using a symmetric cryptography with a ‘trapdoor boomerang onion’ 
(TBO) approach, similar to onion routing [24] used by Chaum in [23]. The trapdoor mechanism consists of sending 
cryptographically secured message which may be opened only by intended party. ANODR author pointed out in [15] 
its low performance in highly mobile networks. In MASK [3] protocol proactive and reactive approach are applied 
simultaneously. A priori anonymous links are established with all neighboring nodes using a symmetric 
cryptography and trusted authority. The path discovery process is conducted in an on-demand manner and mutually 
authenticated nodes participate in the end-to-end communication. Already established path may consist of several 
multipath channels however the source and destination nodes become unauthenticated. In SDAR [4] communication 
between source and destination is based on a public key cryptography. Additionally the destination node shares a 
symmetric session key with each intermediate nodes and uses them to secure discovery path process. This protocol 
take an advantage of onion and on demand routing. Messages in SDAR are large and strongly depend on the number 
of hops. Nevertheless, SDAR as first anonymous protocol for mobile ad hoc networks introducing a trust 
management system. However, this system supports only three levels of permissible reputation limiting therefore its 
efficiency.  
The main objective of anonymous communication in ad hoc network is to provide privacy for all of its users 
represented by nodes. Demanding for privacy guaranties imposes series of requirement for protocol construction and 
addresses problem of many known attacks. In closed networks the level of trust is usually managed by authentication 
mechanisms. In anonymous and mobile ad hoc networks the authentication does not completely solve problems 
related to nodes misbehavior. Additionally, the anonymity of users creates an environment where personal and direct 
incentives to be well cooperative are difficult to meet. Therefore in our proposal of the anonymous authentication 
protocol we employ an enhanced reputation system to detect and avoid cooperation of hostile nodes. 
 In terms of anonymous communication in mobile ad hoc networks the misbehaving means deviation from basic 
and regular functions such as routing (next hop finding) and forwarding (relaying a packets). The trust and reputation 
definitions, which can be found in [22], determine reputation as a level of trust we can assign to every node taking 
into account a probability of future intentions and behaviors. The trust is often treated as a measure of reputation, but 
sometimes they are synonyms. A discussion of different approaches in providing reputation can be found in [14]. All 
of them incorporate the monitoring system as a principle module of misbehavior detection [22] which was 
effectively improved by exchanging the second-hand information [16].  
Liu in [14] presented an enhanced model of reputation for mobile ad hoc networks. This work takes into 
consideration self experience of nodes, time and context dependency and introduce the definitions of services and 
recommendation reputation. In [4] for anonymous MANET a three level community management trust was 
introduced, in which every node is a central node of the community consisting of the rest nearest one-hop neighbors. 
Reputation is created locally, based on detecting packet dropping and modifications. It determines one of three 
  
general classes in all network which is assigned to the node. Based on class membership route discovery is 
conducted. The main drawback of this approach is low granularity of class and not using a second-hand information.  
Our approach for anonymous mobile ad hoc networks is a simple adaptation of Liu [14] reputation model. We 
propose our own method of evaluating recommendation reputation considering past experience and recommendation 
reputation of voters (recommenders). 
3 Anonymous authentication protocol in ad hoc networks 
The proposed protocol consists of two complementary modules. First is in charge of anonymous authentication, 
establishing and maintaining bidirectional routes form source to the destination whereas second one monitors activity 
of nodes being along the existing or discovering path and evaluate their reputation. 
 The process of mutual and anonymous authentication is based on the public-key cryptography and is 
conducted in three-pass handshake. First phase is aimed to initialize a discovery path from source S to destination D 
node. Node S and D know their public-keys with related pseudonyms which are distributed during network setup by 
trusted authority TA. Device S broadcasts a request of discovery path to node D without revealing its identity. Every 
node is obligated to relay this message through the entire network, in particular delivering it to the destination D. In 
the same way every node saves the reverse path form D to S. Node D verifies the validity of received message and if 
succeeds in second phase prepares and unicastly sends response to source node S using already created reverse path. 
The reply message travels hop-by-hop to the node S. When this message gets to the legitimate node S then its 
authenticity is verified. Successfully finished two phases determine bidirectional path from S to D. Generally, it is 
acceptable to establish several paths between nodes S and D (e.g. in order to increase performance of network), 
however initializing node S may choose only a subset of offered by D paths taking into account its preferences 
according to reputation system. This is done in former, confirmation phase of handshake. Supplementary, node D 
generates key material for session keys, one for every path, used by symmetric cryptography algorithms, thereby 
securing established data path. 
The above authentication process is described in details in the further subsections. To clarify and 
transparently present every cryptographic and protocol operations we made following assumptions and notions 
(Table 1): 
• There is, outside of the network, a trusted authority TA managing pseudonyms and related to them pairs of 
public and private keys.  
• A couple of nodes willing to communicate know the pair <pseudonym, public key> of each other.  
• Radio links are bidirectional giving an ability to reputation system of interested node to monitor traffic in 
close node’s neighborhood. It is required by nodes to support on link layer level promiscuous mode 
capabilities. 
• Nodes have enough computation power to perform all introduced cryptographic operations. 
• In the ad hoc network there are nodes with malicious intentions. 
 
h hash function  
EPK X / DSK X asymmetric encryption/decryption with X’s public/private-key PKX /SKX 
EK Y / DK Y symmetric encryption/decryption with Y’s session key KY 
MZ general purpose Z’s message - data payload 
Sig( MZ ) signature of message MZ 
SecK( KY ) protocol for secure key KY transport, (e.g. Shamir’s no key protocol, Elgamal) 
X node identifier (e.g. Medium Access Control address of IEEE 802.11) 
XID pseudonym of user who owns X node 
RID requested path identifier equals h( destination XID ), reverse path ID 
FID forward path ID 
T type of messages REQ, REP, ACK, ERR, request, reply, acknowledge respectively   
Seq request path sequence number  
ISeq internal sequence number delivering randomization and correct packet reassembling  
P padding of length LP 
LP padding length 
RTX X’s reverse table of format <RID, Seq, REQ Source Node> 
RqTX X’s request table containing all sent requests REQ for anonymous authentication;  its format is 
<RID, Seq, Reply>, where Reply is a binary value and indicates a state whether response to this 
request was received 
FTX X’s forward table with format <RID/FID, Seq, From node, KFROM, To node, KTO> 
TIMER clock determining idle time after which a particular entry in RT should be removed 
  
S CA B 
 
Table 1. Notions and their definitions applied in protocol operations 
 
A mobile ad hoc network is initialized with an outside trusted authority TA. The TA delivers to all users possessing 
mobile nodes ability of anonymous participation and communication in their network. The issue of online trusted 
authority was discussed in [11], [21] and is on going authors’ research direction.  
Every user generates list of its pseudonyms <X1, X2, X3,…,XN> and for each of them pair of private and 
public key <SK,PK>X respectively. The TA has its own pair of <SK,PK>TA used for binding pseudonyms and 
public key PKX with user’s real identity UI.  This step is conducted during preliminary setup phase and it allows 
creating revocable anonymity. The TA receives message MUI encrypted with its public key, decrypt it and stores 
bindings of format <UI, PKXN, Xn, SigTA(PKXN, Xn)> in a confidential list CL. In the second phase TA securely 
distribute a public list PL of all network participants concealing real identity UI. For two users UIX, UIY described 
process is illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
Step Sender  Action Receiver 
1 UIX: MUIX = <X1, PKX1>,<X2, PKX2>   
2 UI: EPK_TA(MUI_X) → TA: CL← <UIX, PKX1, X1, SigTA(PKX1, X1)> 
       CL← <UIX, PKX2, X2, SigTA(PKX2, X2)> 
3 UIY: MUIY = <Y1, PKY1>,<Y2, PKY2>  TA: PL← <PKX1, X1, SigTA(PKX1, X1)> 
       PL← <PKX2, X2, SigTA(PKX2, X2)> 
4 UIY: EPK_TA(MUI_Y) → TA: CL← <UIY, PKY1, Y1, SigTA(PKY1, Y1)> 
       CL← <UIY, PKY2, Y2, SigTA(PKY2, Y2)> 
5   TA: PL← <PKY1, Y1, SigTA(PKY1, Y1)> 
       PL← <PKY2, Y2, SigTA(PKY2, Y2)> 
6 TA: EPK_X1(PL) → UIX: DSK_X1(PL) 
7 TA: EPK_Y1(PL) → UIY: DSK_Y1(PL) 
 
Figure 1. Network setup phase. Pseudonyms generation and keys issuing. 
 
 
The following description is based on simplified ad hoc network model composed of five nodes S, A, B, C, D 
illustrated in Figure 2.  Source and destination nodes are denoted by S and D respectively and the rest group of nodes 
intermediate in communication between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A simplified ad hoc network model. Five nodes actively participate in anonymous data path 
establishment. The source node S exchange data with the node D.  
 
3.1 Anonymous authentication initialization – Phase I 
The first phase initializes authentication and path discovery processes. All steps related to this part of protocol are 
illustrated in Figure 3 with notions reflecting to the example depicted in Figure 2. Similar to on-demand routing 
approach, the source node S generates anonymous request message REQ and broadcasts it to the network. The 
message MS contains the pseudonym of a user who owns node S, for simplicity denoted as node’s pseudonym SID, 
indicating which public-key should be used by D in response message. Internal sequence number ISeq is used during 
packet reassembling process and in conjunction with padding is used as a randomizer of the message. The path 
identifier RID is a hash value of destination node’s pseudonym and reveals temporary the destiny of request message. 
This parameter points out that only real destiny D is able to decrypt REQ message. A sequence number Seq of 
request packet determine the validity of the route identified by RID. This is a know mechanism from on-demand 
routing protocols such as AODV [26], DSR [12] which provide routing optimization features described briefly later. 
As soon as source node prepares and sends the request message it saves in its request table  RqTS pair of values 
<RID, Seq, false>, which will be used in request-response binding and protect to reply attack. A third binary value 
indicates a state of reply. 
D
  
 When an intermediate node, according to example node A, receives a REQ message at first time, inserts it 
into its reverse table RTS and broadcasts further. Every next packet identified with the pair <REQ, Seq> is simply 
discarded. This process continues with every node in the network including destination node D. Node D broadcast 
message further in order to conceal fact that it is a real request destiny. This countermeasure compensate fact that 
RID is a hash value on destination pseudonym. The computation overhead of request retransmission for the entire 
network is negligible since every node does not relay the same requests twice. Note, that this move increase 
additional power consumption by D, what is a painful price for being untraceable. Similar approach we can find in 
[3]. Due to performance and memory consumption every entry in RTS table should be removed after some idle time 
determined by TIMER. 
 RID is introduced to avoid computation overhead of public-key PK cryptography on every intermediate 
node. This improvement allow to use linearly scalable PK mechanism without expensive so called ‘trapdoor’ effect, 
where every node tries to decrypt received message checking whether it is legitimate destination. 
 
Step Sender  Action Receiver 
1 S: MS  = SID, ISeq, LP, P   
2 S: RID =  h(DID)   
3 S: REQ, RID, Seq, EPK_D( MS, SigS(MS) ) → A: REQ, RID, Seq, EPK_D( MS, SigS(MS) ) 
4 S: RqTS ← < RID, Seq, false >  A: If < RID, Seq, S > is inside RTA do nothing, else 
continue 
5   A: RTA ← < RID, Seq, S > 
6   A: If h( AID ) ≠ RID 
then go to step 3 and broadcast REQ message,  
else go to Phase II 
3-6 A: step 3 → B: steps 3-6 
3-6 B: step 3 → C: steps 3-6 
3-6 C: step 3 → D: steps 3-6 
 
Figure 3. Initialization/request of anonymous authentication – Phase I 
 
3.2 Anonymous reply – Phase II 
When REQ message comes to destination, in example D, this node should be able to find out received RID on the 
hash values list of all using pseudonyms, Figure 4. It is allowed to use many unique pseudonyms for one identity and 
if it is applicable in reply message node D may suggest to source node S
 
which one is the most preferable for future 
use, denoted as optional parameter DID*. It makes stronger mechanism of protection against to traffic analysis 
attacks. In the next step D decrypts received message and verify its signature, then continues if succeeds. For request 
message node D can find in its reverse table RTD an intermediate node to send a response, in example node C. Since 
the reverse path is well defined the response message may be sent to the source node S. Before that, an additional 
layer of anonymous symmetric cryptography is introduced to conceal the real content of response message. The node 
D generates a session key KN = KDC for an anonymous communication with first intermediate node along reverse 
path direction. Then transports this key to chosen node, e.g. C, using secure transport protocol such as Elgamal or 
Shamir’s no key protocol [25]. In the next step the node D creates its message MD as it is illustrated in Figure 4. The 
purpose of added to MD a session key KSES_D is to create the secured symmetric-cryptography based tunnel between 
nodes D and S. In this tunnel acknowledge message ACK and further communication will be performed. Since 
Phase II every type of message, in this case REP, is hidden in a part of MD/S. Then created message MD is encrypted 
with PKS of source’s node. Message format MC destined to the C contains pair of <RID, Seq> used to follow the 
reverse path routing and additional KNN =KCB known by D, C and in the next step B. This approach is intended for a 
reputation system purpose. Whenever node C sends data to B in behave of D the former will be able to evaluate 
whether data was forwarded correctly or if was sent further at all. These features impose on monitoring nodes an 
additional computation overhead and may be optional. Note, that this feature may be used on every willing node or 
only source and destination excluding intermediate ones as those who do not participate and are not interested in the 
quality of forwarding service. However it is highly encouraged to monitor every activity in the ad hoc network due to 
the reputation system ability of malicious nodes detection, which will be presented in later subsection. Note, that 
described approach does not reveal any information for passive attacker. Keys KNN = KSN* = KDN* are simple 
ignored by source and destination nodes. 
In the next step the previously prepared and encrypted message MC is sent to the node C. At the same time 
D updates its request and forward tables as it is depicted in Figure 3. Additional random identifier FID is issued to 
  
allow independently forward packet messages in both directions. This step is required if both authenticated sides are 
mobile along already established path. More detailed description of this feature presents next subsection. The 
intermediate node C decrypts the message MC and checks out for < RID, Seq > in its request table RqTC whether it is 
a response to its request. If all rows in the table does not match aforementioned pair of < RID, Seq > , then it looks 
for next hop node in RTC, namely B, and updates appropriately its forward table FTC. Next, the node C establishes 
the secure connection with node B in order to forward the reply message further. The procedure continues cyclically 
for nodes C,B,A until the destination node S receives a response to its request.  
 
Step Sender  Action Receiver 
1 D: h( DID ) == RID   
2 D: MS  = SID, ISeq, LP, P, Sig (MS)   
3 D: Verify Sig (MS)   
4 D: choose from RTD node for RID, Seq => C   
5 D: SecK( KN ), KN = KDC ↔ C: SecK( KN ) 
6 D: MD = REP, FID, DID*, KSES_D, ISeq+1, LP, P   
7 D: generate KNN for next hop – B,   
8 D: MC =RID, Seq, FID,KNN, EPK_S( MD, SigD(MD) )   
9 D: EK_N( MC ) → C: EK_N( MC ) 
10 D: RqTD ← < RID, Seq, true > 
D: FT ← <RID, Seq, D, null, C, KN > 
D: FT ← <FID, Seq, C, KN, D, null > 
 C: MC = DK_N( MC ) 
11   C: If < RID, Seq > is inside RqTC go to Phase III, 
else continue 
12   C: choose from RTC node for RID, Seq => B 
13   C: FT ← <RID, Seq, D, KDC, B, KCB>,  
C: FT ← <FID, Seq, B, null, D, null> 
     KDC = KN, KCB=KNN 
5-13 C:  steps 5,7-13 for KN = KCB , KNN = KBA ↔ B: steps 5, 9-13, for KN = KCB , KNN = KBA 
5-13 B:  steps 5,7-13 for KN = KBA , KNN = KAS ↔ A: steps 5,9-13, for  KN = KBA , KNN = KAS 
5-13 A:  steps 5,7-13 for KN = KAS , KNN = KSN* ↔ S: steps 5,9-13, for KN = KAS , KNN = KSN* 
S: FT ← <RID, Seq, A, KAS, S, KSN> 
S: FT ← <FID, Seq, S, null, A, null> 
     KSN* is ignored 
 
Figure 4. Anonymous reply – Phase II 
 
3.3 Anonymous authentication – Phase III 
In the last phase the titled authentication is performed and secure channel between source and destination nodes is 
established. The response to request of S may come from several different locations. It depends on how many 
responses were sent by D using different nodes. However, D may select the most trusted intermediate nodes in its 
nearest neighborhood but it is impossible to manage by D the routing tables along end–to–end path. It means that a 
set of paths may cross each other increasing computational requirements. So, it is advised to support only non-
crossing paths. It may be achieved checking entries inside a forward table. Precisely, if the forward table has an 
empty entry matching <RID, Seq> the path may be established.  
 The Phase III starts when the source node, say S, receives reply messages, what is shown in Figure 5. This 
happen at first time when the given message is identified by < RID, Seq > and in S’s request table RqTS the reply 
status is false. Otherwise message is dropped end internal reputation system is informed about this incident.  
In the next step a source node decrypts the received message and verify validity digital signature. If the 
process finishes successfully the node D is authenticated with the source node S. Then S is ready to prepare 
confirmation message ACK, optionally inserting to it preferable pseudonym for future use SID*. A created 
acknowledge is encrypted with proposed by D session key KSES_D and then sent to the intermediate node using its 
secure tunnel. Sessions keys between forwarding nodes KN are unidirectional (KAB ≠ KBA), so relayed ACK data are 
preceded by key exchanging phase. This approach provide a flexible mechanism for reputation monitoring and its 
using depends on every node power capabilities, in particular the only source and destination nodes may support this 
feature. 
  
 The ACK message traverses through the network form the source to the destination, using unicasted and 
secured channel. If the destination node is able to successfully decrypt and verify ISeq number this means that the 
source node S has been already authenticated with D.  
 
 
Step Sender  Action Receiver 
1 S: < RID, Seq > is inside RqTC   
2 S: check status of Reply:  
if Reply == false then Reply = true and continue 
else STOP 
  
3 S: from step 9 in Phase II 
MS = RID, Seq, FID, KNN, EPK_S( MD, SigD(MD) ) 
  
5 S:MD=REP, DID*, KSES_D,ISeq+1, LP, P,SigD(MD)   
5 S: Verify Sig (MD)   
6 S: MS = ACK, SID*, ISeq+2, LP, P,   
7 S: choose from FTS node for RID, Seq, to S => A   
8 S: SecK( KN ), KN = KSA ↔ A: SecK( KN ), KN = KSA 
9 S: MA = EK_SES_D ( MS )   
10 S: EK_N ( FID, Seq, KNN, MA ), KNN =KAB → A: EK_N ( FID, Seq, KNN, MA ), KNN =KAB 
11   A: choose from FTA node for <RID, Seq, S> => B 
and update  
FTA < FID, Seq, S, KSA, B, KAB > 
FTA < RID, Seq, B, KBA, S, KAS > 
         KSA = KN, KAB = KNN 
12   A: If < RID, Seq > is inside RqTA update Reply 
status, decrypt content and verify ISeq+2, else 
continue 
7-12 A: steps 7-10, for KN = KSA , KNN =KAB   ↔ B: steps 8-12, for KN = KSA , KNN =KAB   
7-12 B: steps 7-10, for KN = KAB , KNN =KBC ↔ C: steps 8-12, for KN = KAB , KNN =KBC 
7-12 C: steps 7-10, for KN = KBC , KNN =KCD ↔ D: steps 8-12, for KN = KBC , KNN =KCD 
 
Figure 5. Anonymous acknowledge, end of authentication process – Phase III 
 
In order to allow communication in both directions additional relation between RID and FID must be stored in a 
source and destination nodes. In real implementation during keys KN exchanging an extension to presented protocol 
is required. Every node should support a table binding values <Originating node ID, KN_ID, KN>, where KN_ID 
should be attached to the plain text header of every sent message. This key identifier should be changed with every 
message to disallow data tracing. This extension does not break the anonymity and requires a small computation 
overhead to every node.  
3.4 Anonymous path maintenance 
Already authenticated nodes can anonymously exchange data between each other. In the mobile environment these 
nodes usually move. The presented protocol supports mobile nodes in the following way. If source or destination 
node change its location loosing a radio range to the first intermediate node then it has to generate a request message 
with valid <RID,Seq> or <FID,Seq> pairs respectively for S and D node. This message is broadcasted to the entire 
network and reaches the second party of the couple <S,D> or one of already engaged intermediate nodes. In the first 
case the replay to the request originator is sent establishing a new anonymous path. If the second case happens, an 
intermediate node generates a reply to the source of request. In these scenarios all steps regarding communication 
between intermediate nodes must be applied. Instead of encrypted authentication payload intermediate nodes should 
insert padding. Appropriate reply message format is as follow: <REP, RID/FID, Seq, KXY*, LP,P > 
In the case of unexpected break down of the anonymous path  (e.g. power supply down in one of the nodes, 
node’s movement) the intermediate node if it is possible should generate in reverse direction undelivered message 
error in format <ERR, RID/FID, Seq, KXY*, LP,P >. After some time determined by TIMER unused forward table 
entries related to  < RID/FID, Seq > should be removed. 
  
3.5 Reputation system 
In an open environment such as mobile ad hoc networks anonymous interactions with unknown entities may be 
a source of behaviors independent from expectations. Trust management based on the reputation system is essential 
part facilitating a prediction and improving a performance of anonymous communication. In this paper we propose 
the distributed reputation system which is adaptation of Liu [14] reputation model.  
Our reputation depends on time, own past experience, second-hand information and is expressed by level of 
trust. This input features are organized with reputation dynamic evaluation scheme providing nodes assessment. 
Proposed model consist of: 
• SRB(A)t – service reputation held by B expressing level of trust to node A in time t, and is taken into 
account whenever B is going to interact with A. 
• IRB(A)t – information reputation held by B expressing level of trust for information received from node A 
in time t, and is used for evaluating received second-hand information form B.  
• VB(A) – second-hand information (vote) containing a recommendation of trust to node A, for an honest 
node is equal SRB(A)t.  
• STB(A) – satisfaction degree of  node B during interaction with the node A. 
• OEB(A)t – own experience of node B based on history of interactions with the node A. 
• Nodes exchange V  information with truthful neighbors. 
• Aforementioned parameters varies in range [-1,1], where the most positive value reflects to the most 
trustworthy parameter.  
 
Every own experience of node B at time TNEW based on history of simple interaction with the node A is updated as 
follows [14]: 
 
OEB(A)T_NEW = OEB(A)T_OLD * ρT_NEW  - T_OLD   +  STB(A) * (1 - ρT_NEW  - T_OLD ), 
 
where fading factor ρ = [0..1] and determine influence history and new satisfaction degree to the own experience. 
 Whenever a new first ST or second hand information V is obtained the service reputation SR is updated. SR 
consists of own experience and weighted average of votes taking into account the information reputation IR of 
recommending nodes. Considering group G of voting nodes on A, the node B takes only those whose IR is positive. 
Own information is usually more valuable [16], [22], hence scaling factor α = [0..1] is introduced to the formula: 
  
 SRB(A)T_NEW = α*OEB(A)T_NEW  +  (1 - α)* ΣP ( IRP(A)T_NEW * VP(A) ) / ΣP  IRP(A)T_NEW        
   
Note that nodes cooperating rarely have small service reputation SR and are not trustworthy in the case of new 
session establishing. 
 In order to evaluate credibility of recommendation V obtained from neighboring nodes it is required to 
update the information reputation IR. In this paper we propose a formula which considers close relations between 
node’s experiences OE with particular node, say A, as well as other voter’s IR and history of this information 
reputation.  
 
IRB(A)T_NEW = β*OEB(A)T_NEW  +  
+  γT_NEW  - T_OLD
 
 *(1 - β)* ΣP ( IRP(A)T_NEW * (VP(A) - OEB(A)T_NEW  ) ) / ΣP  IRP(A)T_NEW ,         
 
where β  is scaling factor for own experience and γ is a time fading factor, both lies in [0..1]. It is recommended to let 
the service reputation SR evolving more dynamically then information reputation IR, which means γ < α. 
The IR parameter depends on difference of our expectations and voter’s information. This formula is different than 
the one proposed in [14]; it prevents to discredit a node with high service reputation by nodes being in collusion. 
Every node during messages exchanging updates service reputation SR depending on its satisfaction level. The 
following list of behavior classes can be identified with anonymous authentication protocol we proposed: 
• Forwarding – during network operations nodes are able to verify an integrity of messages anonymously 
forwarded in behave of them by overhearing the first intermediate node. Every message tampering, delays, 
double relays, dropping are detected as a malicious behavior, 
  
• Receiving – every obtained message that could not be successfully verified, repeated messages with the 
same ISeq, break down a path without error message ERR with detectable presence of misbehaving 
intermediate node are treated as untrustworthy and should be take into account, 
• Anonymous path establishing – an anonymous path establishing are three-pass process and in every phase 
multilayered operations are performed. By default every request packet REQ should be forwarder only once 
by every node. In the case of detection a behavior inconsistent with this rules or obtaining multiple copies of 
reply REP, error ERR messages reputation system should be informed.  
• Recommendation exchanging – sharing reputation between nodes allow to compare own experience with 
a given by recommending nodes. In the case when the one of the votes differs much from the rest voters 
there exists presumption of node discrediting. Additional statistical cross-validation methods may be used 
for this case evaluation. 
 
Interaction of system with protocol is performed ensuring purely anonymous communication. Information between 
nodes is sent on-demand of interested node. Every node may have temporal pair of public and private keys different 
from already assigned to nodes’ pseudonyms. Request for recommendation consist of header with message type 
REQV, sequence number Seq and public key TPK. Every neighboring node should response to that message with a 
TPK encrypted list of pairs <node ID, V> regarding to its nearest neighborhood. Message completed with a header 
of REPV and hash value of (Seq+1) should be directly sent to the originator. A node initiating request message 
should save in its temporary memory the pairs of <REQV, Seq> and remove after some short time determined by 
TIMER. The responses are accepted only once from one node for each <REQV, Seq>, and every abuse of this rule 
should be notify to the reputation system. Described challenge-response scheme with exemplary nodes illustrates 
Figure 6.  
 
 
Step Sender  Action Receiver 
1 A: REQV, Seq, TPK → B: REQV, Seq, TPK 
2  → B: REQV, Seq, TPK 
3 B: REPV, h(Seq+1), ETPK(<A,V><C,V><Z,V>) → A: REPV, h(Seq+1), ETPK(<A,V><C,V><Z,V>) 
5 C: REPV, h(Seq+1), ETPK(<A,V><B,V><Y,V>) → A: REPV, h(Seq+1), ETPK(<A,V><B,V><Y,V>) 
5   A:Verify h(Seg+1), DTPK(<A,V><C,V><Y,V>) 
6   A:Verify h(Seg+1), DTPK(<A,V><B,V><Y,V>) 
 
Figure 6.  Anonymous second-hand information sharing  
 
4 Analysis of security against selected attacks 
In this section the proposed protocol was exposed to analysis against know attacks taking into account an anonymity 
[6], [23], a security and reputation [14]. In this kind of analysis the two types of attacker model are assumed: passive 
and active. Passive attacker usually takes an advantage of overhearing capabilities whereas active attacker tries to 
interact with object of its wicked intentions. In the following analysis we assume attacker of both types of 
adversaries already gained an access to the network form trusted authority TA. 
 An anonymity is guarantied when the sender, receiver and its relationship are undisclosed during all time of 
communication. The following types of the hostile activity are addressed to break down anonymity, reputation 
system and overall mobile ad hoc network: 
• Traffic and data analysis by passive attacker – our protocol incorporates public and symmetric key 
cryptography with randomized tokens inside of each message. In the first phase of anonymous 
authentication only a source location and destination identifier may be known. In the second, third and 
during all the rest of communication only specialized methods of isolating all nodes along the path may 
reveal relation but only on the link layer (MAC). Neither node’s pseudonyms nor its really identities be 
disclosed. Note, that in mobile environment this type of attack is difficult to conduct in along all multiple 
paths.  
• Message coding attack – in this attack the adversary is trying eavesdropping the sending messages and to 
trace those in which the content matches the identified pattern. In our case the randomizing tokens based on 
padding covered by layers of symmetric encryption against to this attack.  
  
• Message length attack – overhearing attacker tries to correlate all messages with the same length along 
chosen part or in the all mobile network. The padding we are using allow every node to setup the message 
length to the same constant value, what makes this attack ineffective.  
• Message replay attack – an adversary tries to reply old packets repeatedly in order to identify a pattern of 
the same behavior during forwarding packets. During anonymous path establishing every doubled request 
messages are silently rejected, however messages repeated through the existing anonymous path will be 
delivered to legitimate receiver and dropped due to improper ISeq number. This would allow adversary to 
perform Denial of Service attack but the reputation system properly running quickly detects this 
misbehavior and isolate the hostile node. Additionally the cross-paths on every intermediate node may be 
allowed [3], [23], which decorrelates replied and forwarded packets. Finally we can enforce frequent 
changing symmetric keys between intermediate nodes, which completely change the content of the same 
repeated packets.  
• Collusion attack (active traffic analysis) – similar to traffic analysis attack performed by an active 
adversaries being in collusion. In this attack we can assume the worst case when all intermediate nodes 
work together against the anonymity of source and destination. For this scenario the asymmetric and 
symmetric encryption in conjunction with random tokens (padding with the sequence number) performed 
between the source and the destination, effectively conceal a source’s pseudonyms and all exchanged data. 
This type of attack in conjunction with message reply attack is able to reveal the locations of both 
communicating sides on the data link layer (MAC) but source anonymity is still ensured.  
• Timing attack – attacker tries to correlate source and destination nodes taking an advantage of timing 
during communication. Times of start, stop, and duration of connection at sending node may be related 
with equivalent times of receiving data at destination node. This attack, similarly to former, may only point 
out the physical relation between nodes without revealing their identities. Additionally it effectiveness 
decreases when network load grows up. 
• Profiling attack – is a long term method of tracing activity in the network. It is usually based on the 
message volume attack, counting the amount of sent data, and timing attack. Prevention and defense 
against to this attack is very hard. Adversaries creating a communication profile of sender and receiver may 
reveal pseudonym, even pseudonyms list of interested nodes. Even though secured channel hide vital data, 
where often changing session keys prevent from confidentiality compromise.  
• Sybil attack – this attack take an advantage of using multiple identities by adversary’s node. Multiple 
MAC addresses of data link layer cause a huge impact to the quality of services in ad hoc network because 
every time an attacker’s node changes its identifier (Medium Access Control) it breaks down all already 
established paths. It is useful if abandoned identity achieve very low reputation in the network practically 
eliminating it from communication. An impersonation of new identity deceives reputation system. More 
sophisticated variety of Sybil attack assumes using multiple identities simultaneously what in conjunction 
with other types of attack may facilitate compromised nodes in cooperation and data exchange in collusion 
attack. The more advanced reputation system may monitor and correlate behaviors of several neighboring 
nodes [22], even those using multiple addresses as well. This improvement requires an additional power 
consumption and is not implemented in our proposal.  
• Man in the middle attack – the proposed protocols is vulnerable to this attack in the case of session key 
exchanging phase between intermediate nodes. The protocol construction assumes end–to–end anonymous 
authentication whereas intermediate nodes become purely anonymous during all communication phases. 
However influence of this attack to an anonymity compromising is negligible because the end-to-end 
encryption layer hides all anonymous communication. 
 
Mobile ad hoc networks, due to their openness suffer from several attacks directed to its routing and forwarding 
features [10], [20]. In our protocol proposal security mechanisms and reputation based neighborhood control makes 
it immune to many of them. The most dangerous attacks aim to denial of service. Wormhole attack is the one where 
defense against it is a big challenge for many known protocols in ad hoc networks. The wormhole attacker records 
all received messages, tunnels it to a different location and retransmit them. If all packets are tunneled there is no 
impact to the communication. But if the tunnel is able to forward, for instance REQ data, faster then other 
intermediate nodes and after that reject a reply message, then successfully breaks down communication. A defense to 
this attack was proposed in [13] and its main idea, called packet leashes take into consideration node parameter such 
as time, velocity, location and verify on the receiver side whether packet traverse the network in realistic time. Our 
protocol proposal is vulnerable to this attack, however wormhole method does not provide any mechanism for 
anonymity revealing.  
  
5 Conclusions  
In this paper we described a new proposal of anonymous authentication protocol for mobile ad hoc networks 
supplemented with enhanced distributed reputation system. Its main objective is to provide end-to-end anonymous 
and bidirectional path of communication in a dynamic and open environment such as MANET. The protocol delivers 
secure data links based on a public and symmetric key cryptography. The distributed reputation system monitors 
activity of nodes being along the path and evaluate their level of trust. In the complementary way it provides efficient 
and well protected mechanisms for the anonymity guaranties and defending to the known attacks. 
 The network initialization and maintenance are important features of MANET and determine its level of 
self-configuring and self-organizing capabilities. In the network setup phase our protocols and other approaches [3], 
[4], [8] as well take an advantage of trusted authority TA. The main goal of TA is key managing for all nodes 
participating in a network. We use TA for creating a revocable anonymity by means of users’ pseudonyms. A big 
challenge for mobile at hoc network is to have an on-line truthful TA ensuring the secure and  anonymous 
communication. Therefore the online identity and key management for MANET is an issue of further direction in our 
research.  
A computational overhead and node’s capabilities constrains is a big challenge for security design in 
MANET [10], [20]. Since the reputation system is promising approach for supporting anonymity we plan to 
incorporate methods with a less computational impact to every node. In terms of network performance we are going 
to perform simulations comparing it with existing approaches. 
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